Parameters Differentiating the Characteristics and Security of Military
  Information Systems by Farooq-i-Azam, Muhammad & Ayyaz, Muhammad Naeem
Parameters Differentiating the Characteristics and 
Security of Military Information Systems 
 
Muhammad Farooq-i-Azam 
COMSATS Institute of Information Technology 
 Lahore, Pakistan 
 
farooq@chase.org.pk 
Dr. Muhammad Naeem Ayyaz 
University of Engineering and Technology 
Lahore, Pakistan 
 
mna@uet.edu.pk 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Revolution in the area of information technology has brought 
about changes in many spheres of life. Today, information 
systems are being used in very sensitive areas such as defence and 
missile control systems, nuclear plants, etc.  Not only has it 
changed how business is conducted, it has also brought about 
entirely new paradigms like that of information and cyber warfare. 
Similarly, one of the many impacts that it has made, is how wars 
are fought. For all what it has contributed, the information stored 
on digital devices and computers has become a precious resource 
and special measures are taken to guard it against attacks from 
malicious users. These special measures are needed by any 
enterprise be it a business firm, a commercial entity, a government 
agency or a military organization. However, requirements and 
specifications for information security and assurance for a military 
organization are essentially different from those of commercial or 
business applications. This paper highlights and discusses various 
aspects related to the security of information resources of military 
importance and outlines certain parameters that should be taken 
into consideration when talking about the security of military 
information resources. W also describe the role satellite 
reconnaissance can play in cyber war. Authors proclaim that this 
paper is first such attempt to correlate cyber war with satellite 
reconnaissance.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Information systems in current age use digital processing and 
storage. Like other spheres of life military is also increasingly 
dependent upon digital information systems. Digital systems and 
networks because of their inherent characteristics are susceptible 
to various kinds of remote attacks. Therefore, the military needs to 
adopt special measures to protect the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of its own sensitive information resource related to its 
own functioning and operations. Furthermore, when attacks 
against the information resources of other important non-military 
institutions of a country are mounted in an organized manner by a 
hostile country, the role of military again comes into play which is 
to protect and defend the information resources of its country and 
to launch offensive attacks against the perpetrator as a tactical and 
strategic measure. Recently, information and cyber warfare has 
been focus of much attention around the world. In particular, the 
CIA, intelligence outfit of USA, carried out cyber warfare 
exercises in 2005 [8]. It is also important to mention that in May 
2010 US army has announced the creation of a cyber war 
command and appointed a four star general to lead it [4]. This 
significant step forecasts the role of information technology in 
future wars and also nature of these wars. Other militaries will 
sooner or later follow these same steps.  
For the information and cyber warfare, the cyber arms needed are 
peculiar information systems particularly designed and developed 
for this purpose. At the heart of these systems are software and 
tools both for attack and defence. Traditionally, there are a lot 
many such tools available including free and open source 
developed by hackers and security professionals and commercial 
software and tools developed by companies. However, these 
traditional tools though suited to attack or defend commercial and 
business systems, are not suited to the needs of a military.  
One of the major reasons for this is the simple fact that software 
tools developed by someone else cannot be relied upon for 
mission critical tasks. There may be intentional or un-intentional 
trap doors left in such tools and software so that it may be 
rendered inoperable at a critical moment. 
Another important factor is the fact that the enemy will not be 
using traditional tools and software for the reasons stated above. 
Therefore, capability, capacity and characteristics of such systems 
are not known in advance. As a result, the countermeasures 
required against such attacks cannot be based upon traditional 
techniques and rather are tailored to use by the military.  For 
example, to communicate some information related to trade and 
commerce, one may rely on openly available commercial 
solutions and encryption algorithms.  However, information 
which is related to defence and military operations needs to be 
taken more seriously. Instead of deploying tools and software 
using a third party encryption algorithm, the military would need 
to develop and implement its own encryption algorithm and 
software for this purpose. In addition, like an integrated circuit 
has different military specifications, this software for use by the 
military would also have different specifications. By the same 
token, the attack mechanisms and countermeasures used by the 
military for information systems are different from traditional 
systems. 
Furthermore, the military information systems may not simply 
comprise of merely computer systems, computer networks and 
software tools. For example, information and cyber war will 
inevitably also use military reconnaissance satellites. Therefore, 
implications and effects of such satellite systems in a cyber war 
should also be taken into account and capacity to counter such a 
scenario should also be developed. 
It is to be further noted that military information systems is not an 
open topic of research due to obvious reasons and not much 
information is available in this area. The research presented in this 
paper is first-hand research and is derived from authors’ 
experience and consistent observation of military use of the 
Internet over the years. 
2. MILITARY INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
REQUIREMENTS 
We have stated previously the reasons for military information 
systems to have different characteristics and security 
requirements. In this section, we give brief details of such 
requirements and characteristics regardless how easy or difficult 
these requirements are as far as their implementation is concerned. 
2.1 Anonymity 
In the case of commercial and business enterprises, the IP address 
blocks used by the organization may be known to the public and 
probably cannot be hidden from being discovered. There are 
various means through which an attacker can enumerate the IP 
address blocks of such organizations. 
However, in the case of military organizations, there are various 
levels of security and confidentiality that are ascribed to different 
institutions of the military. In this case, the IP address blocks used 
by certain unclassified institutes may be known to the public. 
However, IP blocks used by certain other more classified projects 
should be hidden from public view. By stating that an IP address 
block is in public knowledge, we mean, for example, that:  
 
1- Geographic location of an IP address i.e. country, city 
can be found out. 
2-  Organization to which the IP address is assigned can be 
found out. 
3- How do Internet registrars respond to queries against 
these IP address blocks. 
 
In the case of information warfare with military implications, it is 
very important that the source network used for the attack cannot 
be traced back to. Therefore any design and audit of such a 
military network needs special considerations which are different 
from those of commercial and business networks. It is to be noted 
that how such a level of anonymity may be achieved is entirely 
another area of research. In brief, the level of anonymity one can 
achieve is relative to the capability of the enemy. 
2.2 Traffic Concealment 
It is usual in military to keep a tab on the activity of the enemy. 
Translated to the cyber warfare, this means that a military should 
keep a tab on the defence networks of the hostile countries and 
similarly expect the same from the other side and adopt means to 
hide or conceal its networks activity and traffic. If the enemy 
cannot penetrate a network, it would simply be interested to know 
what kind of traffic is flowing to and from network perimeter. 
What kinds of search queries are flowing to and from the network, 
the email messages, who are the people or networks at the other 
end, etc. The exact solution for this problem is encryption. 
However, not all destination networks with which a source 
network communicates support encryption. Therefore, a means 
should be found out to conceal the traffic of a defence network. It 
is to be noted that requirement of concealment of traffic is another 
layer of security on top of anonymity. Appropriate levels of traffic 
concealment may be applied to different computer systems and 
networks having various levels of security. 
2.3 Specialized Encryption 
Conventional encryption algorithms and those available 
commercially are not suitable for the purposes of defence and 
military purposes. On the other hand, a military would never trust 
or share the encryption algorithm it uses itself with another 
country. Or if does, then the communication that uses it is secure 
as long as the provider does not decide to just intercept and 
decipher the cipher text. In other words, an encryption algorithm 
is not something that you can buy from somewhere. For a trusted 
information and communication system, the military needs to 
build, develop and deploy its own encryption algorithms. It is 
general knowledge that the countries like US do not even allow 
the export of commercial versions of certain encryption 
algorithms beyond certain key lengths. 
2.4 Classification of Computer Systems 
The computer systems, network and communication hardware 
employed by the military is usually graded and assigned different 
security levels. Before the equipment is deployed, it undergoes 
various levels of security evaluations and checks. As a very crude 
example, the computer systems may be assigned different security 
levels ranging, say, from 1 to 7 with 1 being assigned to a non-
classified system and 7 to a highly classified system. Different 
evaluation criteria may be developed for these systems which 
again may range from checks on the design and various stages of 
development of the equipment and then final testing before it is 
deployed. It is to be noted that these checks are employed not only 
on the software but also on the firmware and hardware i.e. 
evaluation starts not on procurement but much earlier at the 
design stage of the equipment. For militaries which do not design 
and develop their equipment, this step is skipped thereby 
compromising the security of these systems. If a military cannot 
follow the steps described, it is always better to know where it 
stands if the precautions described are not followed. 
It is pertinent to mention here that hardware Trojan horses at the 
level of circuit board and even integrated circuits are possible and 
is focus of current research [11]. Similarly, BIOS rootkits have 
also been designed and hence any hardware piece of equipment is 
susceptible to almost same kinds of attacks as software systems. 
2.4.1 Hardware Trojan Horses 
Consider the case of a stand-alone digital system i.e. a digital 
system that is not part of any network. As the digital device does 
not interact with any external network, it may be thought that no 
attacks can be mounted against the device. However, it is still 
possible for a malicious design engineer to leave a malignant hole 
i.e. a Trojan horse in the system. For example, a design engineer 
could program a peripheral device to run correctly for all 
operations except, say, #2600th, or program it in such a way to 
behave erratically after certain number of operations or under a 
certain critical condition.  
The designer could also leave a hardware Trojan horse that can be 
controlled remotely, possibly using a radio channel, in an 
otherwise standalone digital system. It may be noted that the 
Trojan horse may be part of a digital system in the shape of 
discrete components or at the level of transistors in an integrated 
circuit. In the first case, the Trojan horse may be present on a 
circuit board of the system and in the second case, it may be 
present inside an integrated circuit in the shape of transistors. 
Above descriptions may seem unlikely to some, and therefore it 
would be interesting to cite just two instances where hardware 
Trojan horses were detected and found spying on unauthorized 
information. In the first instance, Seagate external hard drives 
were found to have a hardware Trojan horse that transmitted user 
information to a remote entity [10].  In the second instance, 
Prevelakis et al. report in [11] that, in 2006, Vodafone routers 
installed in Greece were altered in such a manner so as to allow 
eavesdrop phone conversations of the prime minister and many 
other officials.  
The hardware Trojan horse may be implanted in the hardware 
system at any of the various stages from design to implementation 
including plantation. This includes the possibility of implant by 
the designer at the level of behavioral description, by a third party 
synthesis tool or by the fabrication facility. 
2.5 Software Engineering 
Even in the world of hackers (we use the term in positive sense), it 
is considered bad practice to use someone else’s tools or software 
to test or penetrate a remote system and such folks are somewhat 
derogatorily termed as script kiddies. Almost always, hackers 
leave a trapdoor or some sort of bug in the “tool” they distribute 
to others. For example, even Linux distributions like Slackware 
and Debian which are otherwise considered very secure, leave a 
few unnecessary remote services running which may allow an 
attacker to intrude into the system. Other times, hackers may 
purposely develop a tool such that it leaves a trace or some sort of 
signature so that its action could later be tracked. Therefore, it is 
imperative for the military to develop its own set of cyber arms 
i.e. software and tools needed for military operations. As the only 
resource required for the development of such software is human 
resource, the cost factor is not important. Indeed, the cost of self-
built software may be quite lower than an equal quality software 
purchased from a third party with the added advantage of 
technology transfer. 
2.6 Satellite Reconnaissance 
From the current commercial satellites, the GeoEye-1 launched in 
2008 and operated by the private firm GeoEye located in the US 
has a stated resolution of 41 cm or 16 inches which is the highest 
amongst commercial satellites [7]. Furthermore, just after two 
years i.e. in 2012, the same company GeoEye would launch 
satellite GeoEye-2 that would have resolution twice higher 
resolution i.e. 20.5 cm or 8 inches. We can infer that commercial 
satellite resolution increases at the rate of 2 every four years. Rate 
of increase of resolution of military and reconnaissance satellites 
must be higher than this as primary research in this area is carried 
out by military. However, let us stick with the conservative rate of 
increase of resolution as 2 per four years. Further, resolution of 
military and reconnaissance satellites can be estimated by 
comparing the size of corresponding commercial and military 
organization that run this business  When this comparison is 
made, the private firm GeoEye comes out to be much smaller 
enterprise than their military counterparts i.e. National 
Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the organization which is 
responsible to build and operate US spy satellites. For example, if 
we consider the annual financial budget figures, NRO has annual 
budget of almost US$ 8 billion whereas GeoEye has total assets 
worth almost US$ 790 million i.e. less than one billion. In terms 
of number of employees, GeoEye has only 410 employees as 
compared to almost 3000 people employed by NRO. Therefore, 
we can safely assume that NRO satellites have a resolution that is 
at least 10 times better than that of commercial satellites. 
Therefore, corresponding to GeoEye-1, a NRO military satellite 
would have an estimated resolution of 4.1 cm or 1.6 inches i.e. it 
can take photograph of an individual. And just after two years i.e. 
by 2012, it would have an estimated resolution of 2.05 cm or 0.8 
inches i.e. it would be able to what is being typed on a keyboard. 
This estimate is corroborated from other sources as well. Dwayne 
A. Day in [6] states that US spy satellite KH-8 could be used to 
take photographs of smallest objects and even portraits of 
individuals. We quote Dwayne A. Day from his article [6] as: 
 
“The KH-8 could apparently see objects on the ground as small 
as a baseball” 
 
“There was the time that some Air Force officers used one to take 
a self-portrait”. 
 
It is to be noted that the spy satellite KH-8 for which above 
remarks are made was operated in early 1970s. From this, we can 
once again infer the resolution of current spy satellites. If we trust 
above remarks and also consider the fact that it was almost 30 
years ago that KH-8 was operated, it is certain that resolution of 
the current spy satellites should rather be better than our 
estimates. 
Please note further that satellites have a variety of remote sensing 
capabilities which may include seeing through building structures 
as well. This may well be derived from the fact that satellites have 
long been used to locate minerals and structures underground.  
It is to be noted that, resolution of reconnaissance satellites is not 
stated publicly due to obvious reasons and only estimates can be 
made. Resolution of these satellites as calculated above in this 
paper is what the authors consider as the best estimate.  
Consider above stated capabilities of spy and reconnaissance 
satellites being available for cyber and information warfare. Once 
the geographical location and name of the organization where the 
IP address of an enemy is located is found out, the spy satellite 
can look directly at the person and the systems being used by 
them. Obviously, this sort of capability would have a decisive 
effect on the outcome of the war. 
3. FUTURE WORK 
Each of the characteristics of a military information system that 
we described in this paper leads to a different and its own area of 
research. The attributes and dimensions of a military information 
system that we have provided here just give an abstract and upper 
layer description which are by no means complete and merely 
provide a starting point in this direction. Each of these areas needs 
further investigation so as to provide lower level details of a 
military information system. 
4. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have described and presented parameters that 
differentiate a military information system from commercial and 
business systems. In short, military information systems have 
requirements which are essentially different from those of 
commercial and business systems simply because of the reason 
that military and business systems are used for entirely different 
purposes. Some of such parameters are specialized encryption, 
anonymity, traffic concealment, assignment of security levels to 
computer systems according to their roles, etc. We have also 
suggested and discussed the role that spy satellites can play in a 
cyber war. 
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